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This paper brings together two research fields in applied ethics – namely information 
ethics and business ethics– which deal with the ethical impact of information and 
communication technologies but that, so far, have remained largely independent. Its 
goal is to articulate and defend an informational approach to the conceptual foundation 
of business ethics, by using ideas and methods developed in information ethics, in view 
of the convergence of the two fields in an increasingly networked society. 
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1. Introduction 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have profoundly changed many 
aspects of life, including the nature of entertainment, work, communication, education, 
health care, industrial production, business, social relations and conflicts. Therefore, 
they have had, and continue to have, a deep, widespread and increasing influence on our 
moral lives and on contemporary ethical debates (Floridi, 2007). The goal of this paper 
is to bridge two research fields in applied ethics – namely information ethics 
(henceforth IE) and business ethics (henceforth BE) – which deal with the ethical 
impact of ICTs but that, so far, have remained largely independent. The task is made 
pressing by the realization that we live in a networked society in need of a distributed, 
information-based business ethics. This is not to say that IE and BE have not been  
conversing for some time (see for example (Coates, 1982); (Langford, 1999)). It goes 
without saying that the emergence of a global information society, with its ICT-based 
ethical challenges, and the growing importance of ICT-intensive and networked 
business interactions, have made academic and practical barriers between IE and BE 
increasingly porous (De George, 2003); (De George, 2006).  Nor does it mean that 
ethicists, policy makers, lawyers, and businesses more generally have failed to 
recognise the intrinsically hybrid nature of many key ethical issues. It is widely 
acknowledged that privacy, copyright, informed consent, transparency and disclosure, 
P2P, digital divide, and so forth (Ennals, 1994); (Mason, Mason, and Culnan, 1995); 
(Vaccaro, 2006); (Vaccaro and Madsen, 2009) can be fully understood only if they are 
placed at the intersection between IE and  BE (Hodel, Holderegger, and Lüthi, 1998). 
Rather, the exact point in question is that, despite their obvious commonalities, 
overlapping interests and joint concerns (Wong, 2000), IE and BE have not yet 
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converged on a shared, conceptual foundation of their investigations. Such common 
roots are what I hope to disclose in the following pages, which are structured as follows.  
In section two, I shall provide an outline of IE. The focus will be intentionally 
limited to only those features that will be useful to approach BE informationally. In 
section three, I shall develop an informational analysis of business agents and processes. 
This will lead, in section four, to the identification of the three main ethical questions to 
be addressed by an information-based business ethics, namely  
1) what goods or services are provided?  
2) how are they provided? And  
3) what impact do (1) and (2) have?  
Answers to these questions offer evidence about the moral performance of the system. 
However, in order to motivate, prompt or cause the system to improve its behaviour, 
one has to identify the main points where normative pressure can be exercised. Such 
points are analysed in section five. In section six, I shall argue that profit is neither part 
of the definition, nor the function, of business, but a goal that provides no ethical input 
by itself. Instead, in order to understand what it means for a business to be morally 
good, we need to understand its deepest philosophical roots (ontology), and realise that 
business is an ethically good force in so far as it embodies  human tension between 
being in favour of systemic growth and well-being, and against wastefulness (of 
opportunities, of resources, of demands, of supplies, and so forth), that is, in favour of 
the flourishing of, and against the destruction, corruption, pollution and depletion of 
(parts of) the natural and man-made environment in which a business operates. I shall 
therefore argue that a business agent is increasingly morally good the more successful it 
is in implementing four pro-flourishing and anti-wastefulness principles, mediated from 
IE. In the conclusion, I shall offer a positive note about the respectful, caring, but also 
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fostering and constructionist role that business agents may play as stewards for the 
realities that they can positively affect.  
 
2. From Information Ethics to Business Ethics: a Methodological Contribution 
The informationalization of our environment, of human society and of ordinary life has 
created entirely new realities, made possible unprecedented phenomena and 
experiences, provided a wealth of extremely powerful tools and methodologies, raised a 
wide range of unique problems and conceptual issues, and opened up endless 
possibilities hitherto unimaginable. As a result, it has also deeply affected our moral 
choices and actions, affected the way in which we understand and evaluate moral issues 
and posed fundamental ethical problems, whose complexity and dimensions are rapidly 
growing and evolving. It would not be an exaggeration to say that many of the new 
ethical problems we are facing today are related to the information revolution.  
Readers of this journal do not need to be introduced to the nature and scope of 
BE. In general, I agree with Martin and Freeman (2004) when they argue that ―business 
ethicists are uniquely positioned to analyze the relationship between business, 
technology, and society‖. However, the same readers might be less well acquainted with 
IE. In recent years, IE has emerged as the theoretical foundation of applied computer 
ethics (Floridi, 1999a), the discipline that deals with ICT-based ethical issues (Moor, 
1985). Providing even a short introduction to IE lies well beyond the scope of this 
article.
1
 The relevant point here is that IE offers an innovative and flexible 
methodology, which turns out to be particularly well-suited to model some foundational 
aspects of BE in the new context of a highly networked society. Such methodological 
approach is based on four main features, which can be briefly outlined as follows.  
                                                          
1
 The interested reader might wish to consult (Bynum, 2001), (Tavani, 2007) or (Floridi, 2008). 
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1) The nature of moral agents (Floridi and Sanders, 2004). IE defends a much less 
anthropocentric concept of agents, which also include non-human (artificial) and non-
individual (distributed) entities, as well as networked, multiagent systems and hybrid 
agents (e.g. companies, institutions). This goes hand in hand with BE‘s stress on 
business organizations as ethical agents in and of themselves.  
2) The nature of moral receivers (Floridi, 2003). IE argues in favour of a more inclusive 
and less biologically-biased concept of potential receivers of moral actions as ―centres 
of ethical worth‖, which now encompasses not only humans or living entities, but also 
engineered entities and their networks. Again, this is in tune with BE‘s interest in the 
fate of business organizations as well as with BE‘s expansion of the concept of receivers 
to include not only to shareholders but also to stakeholders of various kinds (Freeman, 
1984). This allows the expansion of classic stakeholder theory (Phillips, 2003) to 
informational entities, the fabric of their networks and, ultimately, to the whole 
environment or infosphere
2
 (more on this below).  
3) The nature of the environment. IE offers an informational, network-based conception 
of the environment, which now includes both natural and artificial (synthetic, man-
made) eco-systems. This is known as infosphere. The term denotes the whole 
environment understood informationally, that is, as constituted by all informational 
entities (thus also including informational agents like us or like companies, governments 
etc.), their properties, and the network of their interactions, processes and mutual 
relations. The infosphere is an environment, and hence a concept, that is rapidly 
evolving. The alert reader will notice a shift from a semantic (the infosphere understood 
as a space of contents) to an ontological conception (the infosphere understood as a 
networked environment populated by informational entities). 
                                                          
2
 Infosphere is a neologism I coined in the nineties on the basis of ―biosphere‖, a term referring to that 
limited region on our planet that supports life. See for example (Floridi, 1999b) or   
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infosphere  
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4) The nature of the moral relations and interactions. IE supports an environmental, 
receiver-oriented approach. It is the well-being of the receiver of the moral action that, 
in principle, ought to contribute to the possible guidance of the agent‘s ethical decisions, 
and potentially constrain and orient the agent‘s moral behaviour. The receiver of the 
action is placed at the core of the ethical discourse, at the centre of the ethical network, 
while the ―transmitter‖ of any moral action (the agent), is moved to its periphery. This 
approach resonates with a variety of BE‘s more advanced views, which can be 
employee- customer- shareholder- and stakeholder-centred (Agle et al., 2008). 
 These four features make IE and Be highly compatible and invite the application 
of IE to the informational analysis of BE,
3
 as we shall see in the next section. 
 
3. The Informational Analysis of Business 
Our first step consists in revisiting the definition of ―business‖ from a network-based, 
informational perspective. There are, of course, two main senses to be taken into 
account: business as an agent, that is, as a node in the network, and business as an 
activity , that is, as a relational process in the network. The standard definition of 
―business‖ as an agent states that   
 
Business (agent) =def. the provider of goods or services to customers. [1] 
 
When ―business‖ is to be understood as a process, activity or interaction, rather than as 
the agent that is its source, the following definition is equally unproblematic:  
 
Business (activity) =def. the provision of goods or services to customers.  [2] 
                                                          
3
 See (Pierce, 1980) or (Floridi, forthcoming). 
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Although [1] and [2] are uncontroversial, the reader will notice that they contain no 
reference to profit, which therefore turns out to be a feature that is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to qualify something as a business agent or process. The importance of this 
remarkable absence is not often appreciated in full, and I will return to it later in the 
article. At this stage, [1] and [2] may seem obvious, but that is the nature of all starting 
points of an adequate logical analysis: they should be uncontroversial to the point of 
being trivial. What follows immediately from [1] and [2] is that one can define 
business-agents as the source of business-activities. Wherever some provision of goods 
or services to customers occurs, there we find a business-agent, whether this is an 
individual selling coconut water on a beach, a school offering tuition, or a multinational 
corporation refining crude oil.  
Once [1] is understood on the basis of [2], it becomes possible to analyse [2] in 
relational terms: the agent is defined in terms of the activity that characterises it, and the 
activity is defined in terms of the ternary
4
 relation that constitutes it. To put it simply, 
we want to be able to state that x counts as a business if and only if, if x is an agent and 
y is a good or service and z is a customer, then x provides y to z. Using classic, first-
order predicate logic and the following abbreviations:  
 
A (x)        = x is an agent 
B (x)        = x is a business 
C (z)        = z is a customer 
D (y)        = y is a (deliverable) good or service 
P (x, y, z)  = x provides y to z  
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x y z  (B (x) ↔ ((A (x)  D (y)  C (z) → P (x, y, z))))   [3] 
 
The formula in [3] expresses more precisely what is stated above more informally. The 
advantage is that it makes it easier to appreciate four major features that we shall need 
in the rest of the article.  
First, [3] shows that it is perfectly possible to have cases in which x = y = z. In 
other words, this means that the three variables could be replaced by the same constant, 
as in the extreme (and rather unlikely) case in which a business sells (parts of) itself to 
(some other parts of) itself. Of course, normally x y and z will be interpreted as different 
constants.  This is as it should be, since our model would be extremely inadequate if it 
could not accommodate the rather common case in which a business sells a product, 
which could also be a business, to a customer, which could also be another business. In 
short, the formula allows for the highest degree of interpretative flexibility.  
Second, [3] is process- or relation-centred, as required above: first comes the 
concept of business as a transaction, which then defines the related elements as business 
agent and customer, not vice versa.  
Third, from [3], it is simple to obtain a customer-centred (or receiver-centred) 
model, as illustrated by Figure 1 below.  
Finally, one can apply to [3] a standard reduction theorem in predicate logic, 
which proves that ternary relations can be reduced to combinations of binary relations, 
e.g. by transforming ―3 is between 2 and 4‖ into ――3 is bigger than 2‖ and ―3 is smaller 
than 4‖‖. It follows that, although it might seem that business as an activity might 
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necessarily require a ternary relation P in order to connect three, non-empty sets of 
related elements – namely B, constituted by the business agents, C, constituted by the 
customers, and D, constituted by the deliverable goods and services – one can actually 
transform P into a conjunction of two relations S and R without any loss of logical 
adequacy. The economic interpretation of S and R would normally be in terms of 
―supplying‖ and ―demanding‖. Given the informational approach adopted in this article, 
we shall use a different semantics and read S as ―sending‖ and R as ―receiving‖. The 
result is shown in Figure 1. 
____________________________________________ 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
____________________________________________ 
We are now ready to simplify the analysis further and obtain the initial model that, once 
transformed from static to dynamic, will serve us for the rest of the paper. I shall refer to 
it as the concentric ring model (see Figure 2). Note that this is not a Venn diagram, 
where the smaller unit is completely contained within the larger one, nor a ―layer‖ 
diagram, like a cake. Rather the three sets C, D, B could be seen as three doughnuts. C 
is like a filled doughnut. It is surrounded by D, which can  be imagined to be  similar to 
a ring doughnut (technically, a torus). In its turn, D is surrounded by B, also shaped like 
a ring doughnut. The threshold between C and D is the relation R, and the threshold 
between D and B is the relation S. We have finally obtained an accurate but also 
intuitive representation, as a single object, of our logical model in Figure 1.   
____________________________________________ 




The concentric ring model, illustrated in Figure 2, places customers at the centre of all 
business activities. This is a valuable feature. The model further highlights the absence 
not only of profit as part of the definition of business (whether as an agent or as an 
activity it does not matter), as expected, but also of two other aspects that have been 
extensively discussed in the literature on business ethics: the problem of (fair) prices, 
which now appear to be a property of elements of D, and the nature/identity of business 
agents, that is, the elements of the set B, now defined as the sources of good/services. 
The model, however, still has one major limit: it is merely static. So it fails to take into 
account the interactions between business agents and customers over time and within a 
shared, networked environment. This is the last refinement that needs to be provided. 
The parameters in our dynamic model are obviously time (the x axis) and the 
number of interactions between the various elements (the y axis). By placing the 
concentric ring models or whirlpools (their influence on the surrounding environment 
proceeds like decreasing waves) obtained above, in such a 2D space, we finally reach a 
more accurate description of the development of business interactions in real life, one 
which will suffice to explain and discuss critically the analysis developed in the rest of 
the article. I shall refer to this model as the whirlpool model. Figure 3 provides an 
illustration. Note that it is like a snapshot of a dynamic system: the whirlpools should be 
imagined as constantly increasing and then decreasing. 
____________________________________________ 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
____________________________________________ 
We now have a sufficiently detailed analysis of the object whose properties need to be 
investigated. Given the complex, informational, networked scenario represented by the 
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whirlpool model, what are the main kinds of ethical questions faced by business agents? 
This is the key issue addressed in the next section. 
 
4. The WHI Ethical Questions: What, How and Impact 
Consider Figure 3. It seems evident that the fundamental questions to be addressed by 
an informationally-modelled BE concern: 
1) What goods/services are provided? 
2) How are they provided? 
3) What impact do (1) and (2) have on both natural and artificial environments? 
Figure 4 illustrates how the questions may be located in our model. Let me briefly 
comment on each of them. 
____________________________________________ 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
____________________________________________ 
By asking (1), an ethical theory concentrates on the product and hence shows that 
questions regarding the moral nature of the sender (―is the so and so business 
agent/source morally good or evil?‖) are still important but can be dealt with as 
secondary. This is perfectly in line with mainstream ethical theories, which consider 
―good‖ and ―evil‖ as properties qualifying primarily actions and their outcomes, and 
only secondarily their sources. We qualify someone as mainly good or evil depending 
on whether his or her actions or their effects are mainly evil or good. Accordingly, in 
our model, business agents, their states and plans, are identified as morally good or evil 
not in themselves, but only in a derivative sense, that is, following the assessment of 
their actions and the corresponding outcomes.  
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By asking (2), the same ethical theory addresses the moral nature of the process 
that leads to a particular output. Whereas question (1) concerns the nature of the 
elements of the set D, question (2) concerns the nature of the relation S between B and 
D.  
Finally, no ethical analysis would be complete without a careful investigation of 
question (3), that is, the impact that the supply of specific goods/services, and hence the 
presence of goods/services themselves, have on the networked environment within 
which the business agents operate in interplay with their customers.  
Depending on how one answers questions (1)-(3), there follows a different 
ethical evaluation of the business agent under investigation. However, if one wishes to 
modify that agent‘s behaviour, the WHI questions are of little help. They might signal 
that something needs to be done, but they cannot help in achieving the required 
modifications. For such a pragmatic goal, the whirlpool model needs to identify what 
one may call the right points of normative pressure, the topic of the next section.  
 
5. Normative Pressure Points 
We have just seen what the most fundamental ethical questions that might be asked in 
BE are, when BE is approached from an IE perspective. I also anticipated that it would 
be a mistake to think that they are also the points where normative pressure can be 
exercised on the system. Answers to the WHI questions may indicate how well (or 
indeed how badly) the overall system is performing, morally speaking, but they only 
contribute informatively to the process of guiding and shaping the system. 
Pragmatically, insofar as the processes of motivating, fostering, causing or preventing 
new conducts are concerned, we need to identify ways in which the performance of the 
system may be successfully affected. In other words, we need to identify the main 
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points where normative pressure can be exercised with some hope for success. Such 
points are three (or a combination of them) since, ideally, normative pressure should be 
exercisable on each of the three sets constituting the model (see Figure 5). 
1) Educational pressure on C. One might exercise pressure on the system by educating 
or informing customers about the answers to the WHI questions. The availability, 
accessibility and transparency of more and better information about  
 what goods/services are provided,  
 how they are provided, and  
 the impact that their provision has, or might have, on the overall environment or 
infosphere,  
helps customers to make and shape their choices, and hence provides a significant way 
of influencing the moral behaviour of business agents. This is what drives not only 
standard competition, but also phenomena such as ethical consumerism and fair trade 
certification (Crane and Matten, 2007). 
2) Prescriptive pressure on D. The system may also be influenced by indicating what 
goods/services ought to be (of course both positively and negatively). This often means 
identifying requirements, specifications or standards that ought to be satisfied by the 
provided goods/services. We shall see that quality certification and control, as well as 
the indication of what features goods/services should or should not have, can be not 
only an ethical but also a legal issue. 
3) Proscriptive pressure on B. Finally, business agents may be influenced directly, 
through moral (or legal, see below) proscriptions about what ought not to be done. 
 As anticipated, in each of the previous three cases pressure can be exercised not 
only morally, but also legally. The point is worth clarifying. So far, we have analysed 
the ethical business system as if only two types of agents were involved in the network, 
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businesses, interpreted as senders, and customers, interpreted as receivers. The State 
(and by this I mean to refer to any entity with the legal power and legitimacy to impose 
its decisions on the whole whirlpool system, at least in principle) represents a third set 
of agents. Ideally, by issuing laws, imposing sanctions or disincentives and offering 
rewards or incentives, the State is expected to play the role of facilitator, regulator and 
referee of the communication system. Thus, the role of a liberal State in a modern 
democracy is proscriptive and proactive when it comes to the behaviour of business 
agents: it focuses on what business agents should not do (the legal don‘ts) and on 
incentives to facilitate specific behaviours which are morally good or beneficial to the 
whole system or society. However, the role becomes prescriptive and reactive when the 
goods or services provided are concerned: the liberal State legislates on what they ought 
to be (the legal dos) and on the sanctions that might be imposed, if such legislation is 
not respected. The State‘s intervention in the network is usually hugely influential, as it 
adds a third dimension: the system acquires not only ethical norms but also legal rules 
or laws, and hence corresponding incentives, disincentives, prohibitions and sanctions 
(Nelson, 2006). Of course, ethical norms aim at inviting endorsement, whereas legal 
rules seek to enforce compliance. The former are supposed to foster moral behaviour, 
the latter might be entirely neutral about it. How does this third dimension affect our 
model? An example will help to clarify the issue.  
Consider the tobacco industry and more specifically the cigarette business. B is 
represented by tobacco companies, which send (i.e., produce and sell) goods in D, let us 
say cigarettes, which are received (i.e., bought) by C, individual customers. Answers to 
the three WHI ethical questions are well known and do not have to be rehearsed here. 
What about the normative pressure points and the State‘s intervention? Through 
taxation, the setting of age limits, the indication of non-smoking areas or the constraint 
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on advertising forms and targets, the State exercises an external control on the system 
which is not, in and of itself, of a moral nature, but that has the function of facilitating 
moral behaviour. There is nothing intrinsically right or wrong, morally speaking, in 
smoking a cigarette in a cinema. By making it illegal, however, the State makes it easier 
to give up a bad habit, to prevent fire hazards, to diminish passive smoking and so forth, 
and these effects have a morally positive value, insofar as they are good for the system 
in general and its individual receivers in particular. Smoking is unhealthy, can easily 
become an addiction and hence a moral vice, and the State seeks to make the choice of 
smoking more difficult and responsible, without infringing individual liberties. The 
same applies to wine, beer and spirits. It should really apply to other recreational drugs 
as well, such as cannabis. Next, by making it compulsory to provide health information 
regarding smoking – e.g., health education in schools, documentaries on TV, or health 
warnings on cigarette packets – the State exercises direct moral pressure on the system 
through the ―education of C‖, one of the normative pressure point discussed above. In 
terms of prescriptions, the second pressure point, consider the ethical choice of 
producing only self-extinguishing cigarettes (available since the 30s). This could be a 
moral choice of the producers, instead of becoming a proactive legal requirement 
brought about by some legislation, as it is already the case in several American states, 
such as New York, Massachusetts and California, and it might soon happen in the EU. 
After all, burning cigarettes are among the main causes of fires. Finally, in terms of 
proscriptions, ―Joe Camel‖ provides an illustrative example. In 1987, RJR created Joe 
Camel as the mascot for the brand of Camel cigarettes. In 1991, the American Medical 
Association reported that the campaign had been particularly popular among 5- and 6-
year olds, who apparently could recognize Joe Camel more easily than Mickey Mouse, 
Fred Flintstone, Bugs Bunny or even Barbie (Fischer, Schwartz, Richards, Goldstein, 
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and Rojas, 1991). This led the association to invite RJR to terminate the Joe Camel 
campaign. Although RJR initially declined, in 1997, after further appeals, the Joe Camel 
campaign was replaced by a somewhat more adult campaign. The point is that RJR 
never lost a legal battle on this issue, but acted in a way that, whatever the ultimate 
motives might have been, had a positive moral outcome.  
 
6. The Ethical Business: from IE to BE 
The previous analysis has provided the formal framework within which BE can be 
interpreted informationally. Some of the features of the model already cast a different 
light on the ethical agenda of BE in a networked society. Three issues – (1) the nature of 
business agents, (2) the fairness of prices of goods or services, and (3) the obtainment of 
profit (Friedman, 1970) – have been shown to be of much less pressing concern than (4) 
the nature of the delivered goods or services, (5) the ways in which they are produced, 
and (6) what impact their provision might have on the overall environment. This is 
interesting, since it seems that much of contemporary BE has been focused more on (1)-
(3) than on (4)-(6). What the previous formal analysis cannot provide yet is actual 
content (as opposed to a formal analysis) that is, a coherent vision, based on explicit 
ethical principles, of what an ethical business in the information society should be like. 
This is the last but perhaps most important contribution offered by IE.  
It seems uncontroversial that, in order to be just and fair, laws and regulations 
should be at least compatible with, if not directly based on, morally right norms (ethical 
prescriptions and proscriptions), which in turn may be expected to depend on morally 
good principles. But what sort of morally good principles should guide business agents? 
How are we going to know when the answers to the WHI questions are morally 
unsatisfactory? And how can we judge whether, and what sort and degree of normative 
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pressure should be exercised, and in which direction, if the behaviour of the agents in 
the networked system is deemed unsatisfactory and needs to be rectified? Much seems 
to depend on how we understand the ultimate nature of business itself, its function, goal 
and role in society, in other words, its deep ontology.  
Recall the definition of business given in [1]. It applies both to for-profit and to 
non-profit business organizations. Indeed, following [1], even business organizations 
with negative net profit do not, for this reason, stop qualifying as business agents. So 
profit is clearly not part of the essence of a business, not in the sense in which having 
three sides is part of the essence of a triangle. Unfortunately, this point is often 
overlooked, by objecting that, being profitable might not be part of the nature of what 
may count as business, but it does capture its basic or primary function. At least in the 
case of for-profit enterprises, that very qualification refers exactly to what the task or 
function of a business is, although not its necessary and sufficient conditions. If this is 
granted, then one might further argue that the function, i.e., profit, determines the moral 
quality of the function-bearer, namely the business). With an analogy, our opponent 
might argue that the definition of a knife does not include ―being sharp‖, but since a 
knife‘s function is to cut, then the sharper the knife is the better it cuts, and so the better 
that knife should be judged to be.  
The reasoning is, once again, muddled, for it fails to distinguish between a 
functional analysis (―for cutting‖) and a teleological analysis (cutting in order to achieve 
which goal?). Suppose, just for a moment, that profitability could qualify as the primary 
function of business. A sharp knife is a very good knife functionally speaking, but a 
morally bad tool in the hands of a serial killer. A very profitable business would be a 
very good business functionally speaking, but still a moral tragedy if run by a child-
pornographer. Clearly, if profit is understood as the function of business, this leaves 
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unanswered any moral question worth asking. We have begun to rectify the confusion. 
From a functional perspective, profit may be (and often is) the much desired effect of a 
well-run business, whose primary function, nevertheless, remains that of providing 
goods and services to customers. If the distinction is unclear, the following analogy 
should help. People who argue that profit is the primary function of business are as 
mistaken as those who argue that the primary function of sexual intercourse is pleasure. 
Naturally, pleasure plays a very important and positive role, and of course animals may 
pursue sexual pleasure only for its own sake or, in the case of humans, for mental 
reasons as well. All this, however, should not blind us to the fact that sexual intercourse 
has a reproductive function.  
So far we have established that profit is neither part of the essence nor the 
function of business. Recall that we are trying to understand on which moral principles 
a business could be ethically evaluated. Now, our opponent has a further reply. Let us 
admit that the distinction between essence, function and goal of a business is sound. 
Profit might be transformed into the teleological goal of a business, that is, into its 
purpose or mission. A morally good business would then be one that takes due care of 
its goal – being profitable – in view of the advantage that this brings for its 
shareholders. Here, we find the most dangerous mistake, because it is the least visible. 
First, let me clarify a final point about the function of business. Above, we assumed that 
profit could play such a role. We conceded this only for the sake of argument. Our 
opponent has now reinterpreted profit as playing the role of a business‘ goal. This has 
left empty the role of function. We know from [1] and [2] that the function of business 
is to provide goods and services to customers. Like the knife before, the more successful 
a business is, in providing goods or services to its customers, the better it is functionally 
speaking. Notice, however, that our opponent is still waiting for an answer to his 
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objection that profit might be the purpose orientating the function. This requires one 
further distinction.  
It is a fact that most, if not all, businesses have profit as their main, if not only, 
ostensible goal. This fact, however, should not mislead us into thinking that we have 
finally hit upon the foundation for an ethical evaluation. Consider the difference 
between: 
a) what is good for x; and 
b) what x is good for. 
We are interested in the case in which x = business. Following (a), profit is certainly 
what is good for business. Without it, business can much less easily grow in size, 
develop in quality and flourish as a rewarding and successful enterprise for the people 
involved. Yet this is a factual remark, similar to what we said above about the sharp 
knife. Profit, in this sense, still does not draw any difference between morally good or 
evil businesses. For profit is ethically blind: it rewards any business that pursues it 
successfully. Profit would still be a good thing for business even if the business were 
that of trading slaves. The ethical question is addressed once we move to (b). What is 
the business, for which profit is indeed a good thing, good for? The answer must 
arguably come from a consideration of the contribution made by the business in 
question to the network in which it is embedded, its overall environment, by which I 
mean not just its physical or natural habitat, but ultimately the whole ecosystem affected 
by that business, by its practices and its products or, in the informational vocabulary of 
IE, the region of the infosphere that is affected by that business. Of course, (b) can be 
answered purely factually, by arguing that profit is what business is good for. In this 
case, there is no circularity but rather mere consistency. The problem is not logical, but 
conceptual: we are still failing to touch upon the moral question. Profit is good for 
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business and business is good for profit. The ethical blindness is still there, as we are 
still unable to distinguish between a morally good and a morally evil business. In order 
to provide such a normative evaluation, we need to address (b) in such a way as to step 
into the realm of ethical principles. We need to decide what a business is morally good 
for. This is the deeper ontological question that really matters, ethically speaking, and it 
is one that, following IE, can be addressed from a receiver-oriented perspective. 
  From the receiver-oriented perspective supported by IE, business is the art of 
matching supply and demand and, in so doing, fostering human flourishing and 
avoiding wastefulness. By wastefulness I mean any kind of destruction, corruption, 
pollution and depletion of (parts of) reality, that is, any form of impoverishment on the 
side of the receivers of the business activities. It follows that a business agent is 
increasingly morally good the more successful it is in implementing the following 
environmental principles, mediated by a more abstract and inclusive analysis provided 
by IE: 
1. wastefulness ought not to be caused in the world (the infosphere) 
2. wastefulness ought to be prevented in the world (the infosphere) 
3. wastefulness ought to be removed from the world (the infosphere) 
4. the flourishing of entities as well as of the whole infosphere ought to be 
promoted by preserving, cultivating and enriching their properties.  
Following the analysis developed in this paper, these four principles play a twofold role. 
On the one hand, they can provide clarification when answers to the WHI questions are 
morally unsatisfactory. On the other hand, they can indicate how the behaviour of the 
overall system could be improved. To put it more simply, they can be used as a 
yardstick to tell when business matters are not going morally well, and how they can be 




We are living in a networked environment (infosphere) that is becoming increasingly 
synchronized (time), delocalised (space) and correlated (interactions). Previous 
revolutions (especially the agricultural and the industrial ones) created macroscopic 
transformation in our social structures and physical environments, often without much 
foresight. The informational revolution is no less dramatic. We shall be in deep trouble 
if we do not take seriously the fact that we are constructing the new environment that 
will be inhabited by future generations ((Floridi and Sanders, 2005)). We should be 
working on an ecology of the infosphere (Floridi, 2007). Unfortunately, I suspect it will 
take some time and a whole new kind of education and sensitivity to realise that the 
infosphere is a common space, which needs to be preserved and improved to the 
advantage of all (for advancements in this direction see, for example, (Wood and 
Logsdon, 2008)). One thing seems unquestionable though: business is part of the human 
exception (Floridi, 2006). Perhaps even more than the use of language or tools, we are 
the only animals that do business (other animals trade favours at most, they do not 
engage in financial transactions). So civilizations and societies are often evaluated on 
the basis of how friendly they have been towards this special feature of human life. It is 
to be hoped that the information society will be judged, by future generations, as 
business-friendly, and that such friendliness will be repaid by the respect and care 
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 A first version of this article was presented at ―Network Ethics: The New Challenge in Business, ICT, 
and Education‖, the second in a series of biennial conferences on ethical issues of technology in business, 
education, and society, organised by the Center for Ethics Business and Economics (CEBE) of the 
Catholic University of Lisbon - FCEE, Carnegie Mellon University, and the University of Northern Iowa, 
and  held at the Catholic University of Lisbon, Portugal, June 23-25, 2009. I am very grateful to Antonino 
Vaccaro for his kind invitation and his comments on an earlier draft, to the audience for the lively and 
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Figure 4. The WHI Ethical Questions: What, How and Impact 
 
 
